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The Returns From 
Informal Venture Capital Investments:
An Exploratory Study
Annareetta Lumme 
Colin Mason 
Markku Suomi
Despite the recent increase in research on informal venture capital there are many 
aspects of this market for which no information exists. One such issue is exits. This 
exploratory study is the first to address this issue. It is based on a survey of 38 active 
business angels in Finland who had made a total of 155 investments; 20 of these inves­
tors had made 49 exits. Two aspects are addressed. First, evidence is presented on 
investment performance and the timing and method of exit. Second, the paper explores 
differences between those investors with a successful track-record of exits and those 
with an unsuccessful track-record. Differences are identified in terms of motivations for 
investing, volume and sources of information on investment opportunities, prior rela­
tionship with investee businesses, perception of value-added and employment back­
ground. However, conclusions should only be regarded as suggestive in view of the 
small numbers involved.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is little dispute that the informal venture capital market represents the largest 
source of external equity finance available for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and is significantly larger than the professional venture capital market.^ 
For example, Gaston (1989) suggests that in the USA professional venture capital 
funds make forty times fewer investments in SMEs than informal investors—or 
business angels as they are better known—and invest less than one-tenth of the 
amount invested by business angels. Estimates for the UK and Finland both sug­
gest that the informal venture capital market is at least twice as large as the institu­
tional venture capital market in terms of the amount invested (Harrison & Mason, 
1993; Suomi & Lumme, 1994).
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Furthermore, business angels are the dominant source of finance at the forma­
tion and early growth stages of new venture development. Studies of the invest­
ment portfolios of business angels suggest that 70 to 80% of their investments are 
in seed, start-up and early stage businesses (Gaston, 1989; Harrison & Mason, 
1992a; Landstrom, 1993; Mason &, Harrison, 1994). Research into the financing of 
new high technology-based firms (NTBFs) in the USA also finds that “private 
investors exhibit a significantly higher propensity to invest at the seed and start-up 
stages than other investors.... In fact, private individuals provided the seed capital 
that launched the majority of NTBFs in the sample’ (Freear & Wetzel, 1990, pp. 
88-89). In similar vein, Roberts (1990, p. 84) has observed that “the great major­
ity” of the initial financing of new technology enterprises through outside investors 
has been undertaken by business angels. Yet despite this evidence of the impor­
tance of the informal venture capital market as a source of early stage venture cap­
ital, the amount of research that has examined its characteristics and operation 
remains remarkably limited.
The pioneering studies of the informal venture capital market in the early and 
mid 1980s that were undertaken in the USA with funding from the US Small Busi­
ness Administration (e.g. Wetzel, 1981; Wetzel and Seymour, 1981; Arum Asso­
ciates, 1987, Gaston & Bell, 1986; 1988; Gaston, 1989) simply sought to “put 
boundaries on our ignorance” (Wetzel, 1986, p 131). International interest in the 
topic led to studies in Canada (e.g. Short & Riding, 1989; Riding et al, 1993), the 
UK (Mason & Harrison, 1994), and the Nordic countries (Landstrom, 1993; 
Lumme & Suomi, 1994). As a result, there is now a fairly good understanding of 
what might be called the “ABC of business angels”^— t^heir investment activity, 
behaviour and characteristics. In addition, there have also been a number of poUcy- 
related studies which have been concerned primarily with initiatives to stimulate 
informal venture capital activity through the introduction of business angel net­
works (e.g. Mason & Harrison, 1995a; Harrison & Mason, 1996).
Thus, progress in informal venture capital research has primarily involved a 
“widening” of our understanding by addressing ABC-type issues in a variety of 
geographical contexts. This restricted focus has led to a call for a “deepening” of 
research. In their research agenda towards the year 2000, Freear & Wetzel (1992, 
p. 483) proposed that more attention should be given “to the need to develop 
explanatory and predictive theories for empirical testing.” Some progress has been 
made in this direction, for example, by Landstrom (1992) who has examined the 
business angel-entrepreneur relationship in an agency theory context and by Fiet
(1995) who has examined risk avoidance strategies of business angels and venture 
capitalists and how this relates to their use of networks of informants. Some new 
avenues of enquiry have also emerged. Examples include studies of the demand- 
side (e.g. Freear & Wetzel, 1990; Freear, Wetzel & Sohl, 1995), the decision-mak­
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ing process (Mason & Harrison, 1996a; Mason & Rogers, 1996; 1997) and the 
post-investment relationship (e.g. Mason & Harrison, 1996b).
Nevertheless, there remain many aspects of the informal venture capital mar­
ket for which no information exists and where Wetzel’s call for research which 
puts boundaries on our ignorance remains valid and appropriate.^ One such issue 
concerns the performance of informal venture capital investments and the harvest­
ing of such investments (Freear, Sohl & Wetzel, 1996). Although there is some 
evidence on the expectations of business angels, in terms of their exit horizon, 
method of exit, the rate of return and proportion of “winners” and “losers” (Wetzel, 
1981; Tymes & Krasner, 1983; Mason & Harrison, 1994) there have been no stud­
ies of the actual returns achieved by business angels nor their actual timing and 
method of exit.
The purpose of this paper is to fill this significant void in our knowledge of the 
informal venture capital market by examining the exits made by a sample of Finn­
ish business angels. The paper first looks at the aggregate pattern of exits and then 
explores differences between successful and unsuccessful investors.
n. METHODOLOGY
Business angels are extremely difficult to identify. They have a preference for ano­
nymity, there are no directories of individual investors and no public records of 
their investment transactions (Wetzel, 1981; 1987). They may also be reluctant to 
respond to research surveys because of the private and personal nature of the sub­
ject matter and the fear of being identified and then deluged with investment pro­
posals (Haar etal, 1988). The size and characteristics of the population of informal 
investors is therefore unknown, and probably unknowable (Wetzel, 1981). 
Because the population is not known, this means that it is not possible to test any 
sample of business angels for its representativeness.
The approach that was used in this study"^  was based on evidence from a 
review of previous studies that the most effective method of both identifying busi­
ness angels and obtaining a high response rate is by personal contact through “net­
working” (Mason & Harrison, 1994). Moreover, as investors tend to be linked by 
friendship and business networks, identification of an initial group of informal 
investor typically leads to an introduction to others. A list of 151 names was com­
piled following approaches to a business mentor organisation and to business pro­
fessionals (e.g. venture capitalists, science park managers) plus referrals from the 
investors identified by these two sources. Contact with these individuals led to 
completed face-to-face interviews with 59 of them, comprising 38 active and 21 
potential business angels. The active angels had made a total of 155 investments in 
unquoted companies and 20 investors had exited from 49 of them. It is these inves­
tors and these exits that are the subject of this paper.
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A number of limitations to the study should be noted at the outset. The first, 
and most significant, limitation is that the exit information is not deal specific but 
is only investor specific. Second, the number of exits is relatively small. This 
reflects the inherent difficulties in identifying business angels, the small popula­
tion of business angels that exist in a country the size of Finland (5 miUion popu­
lation) and the underdeveloped nature of its equity culture. Indeed a formal venture 
capital industry has only been in existence in Finland since the late 1980s. Thus, 
the concept of making informal venture capital investments is relatively new. The 
small number of exits prevents any statistical analysis from being undertaken. 
Third, the sample is likely to be biased towards the more active business angels in 
Finland. As such, these investors may have a high average number of exits. Fourth, 
there may be a bias in favour of investors with a strong interest in investing in tech­
nology businesses because of the networking sources used to identify business 
angels.
III. ACTIVE BUSINESS ANGELS IN FINLAND: AN OVERVIEW
Personal Characteristics
Based on this sample (Suomi & Lumme, 1994), Fiimish business angels 
broadly conform to the profile identified in studies of business angels in other 
countries. In terms of their personal characteristics active business angels in Fin­
land are predominantly males (95%) and the majority are aged between 40 and 
60 (67%). In this respect Finnish business angels are somewhat older than those 
identified in the USA and the UK, but similar in age to Swedish business angels 
(Landstrom, 1993) which no doubt reflects the higher tax rates in Nordic coun­
tries, meaning that it takes longer to achieve a high net worth. Finnish business 
angels are also well educated: 56% have a Masters degree, which is the basic uni­
versity degree in Finland, and a further 8 % have a Ph.D. Nearly half (48%) have 
backgrounds in technology and over one-third have backgrounds in commerce 
(38%).
Finnish business angels are extremely entrepreneurial: 95% of active business 
angels have participated in the founding of at least one company; the median num­
ber of companies founded by the sample is five and the median number of years of 
experience as an entrepreneur is 15. In addition, half have also held top manage­
ment positions in large companies (median of 10 years experience). Not surpris­
ingly, the main source of wealth of the sample of active angels is derived from 
these entrepreneurial efforts. Only 16% of business angels reported that their main 
source of wealth was inherited.
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Deal Flow and Investment Activity
The sample of active business angels receive a median of six investment pro­
posals per year, with 80% receiving fewer than 10 proposals. The most frequent 
source of information on investment opportunities is business contacts and friends. 
However, venture capital firms, although a source of information for only a minor­
ity of business angels, was rated as providing the best quality of information on 
investment opportunities. In the three years prior to the survey the business angels 
had received a total of 330 investment opportunities; 3 or 4 out of every 10 were 
seriously considered from which one investment was made.
Investment Characteristics
Business angels in Finland typically make relatively small investments. Three 
quarters of investments involved amounts of less than FM 800,000 (approx. 
$175,000).^  By comparison, the average venture capital investment in Finland is 
FM 2 million. Nevertheless, larger investments do occur, and 25% of investors 
had, at some stage, made investments which exceeded FM 3 million ($650,000).
Their investments are concentrated at the seed (23%), start-up (29%) and early 
stage (23%) of new venture development: indeed, these stages account for three- 
quarters of all the investments made by the sample of active business angels. Their 
investments are also more often in manufacturing (65%) than services (35%). 
About 40% of investments (62% of manufacturing investments) were in high tech­
nology sectors. Finnish investors, just Uke those in the USA and UK, exhibit a 
marked preference for investing in businesses located close to home: 60% of 
investments were located within 50 km of their home or office.
Just over half of all investments by Finnish business angels are syndicated, 
normally with other business angels (43%) but occasionally with venture capital 
funds (9%). Moreover, it is quite conomon for the business angel or syndicate not 
to be the only external investor in the business. A further one-quarter of businesses 
in which the sample of business angels had invested had raised finance indepen­
dently, either before, after or at the same time, from another business angel or a 
venture capital fund.
In a majority of cases the investor had some kind of formal or informal link or 
knowledge of the company before making their investment. The most common 
connection was simply that the investor knew the owner or management team 
(43%). However, in some cases (8 %) the investor had been in some form of busi­
ness relationship (e.g. supplier, customer) or had been a consultant or mentor (8 %). 
Moreover, in those 40% of cases in which the firm had been unknown to the inves­
tor in this study it is possible that a syndicate member had links with the firm.
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rv. EXIT ACTIVITY 
Aggregate Evidence
The sample of business angels had made a total of 49 exits. In those cases for 
which information on returns was supplied (n = 40) one-third provided a signifi­
cant or modest return to their investor, and 1 in 5 provided significant financial 
returns (an IRR in excess of 20%), while at the other extreme just over half resulted 
in a partial (18%) or full (38%) loss (Table 1). This compares with Finnish venture 
capital companies which reported 1 in 3 of their exits in 1993 to have been profit­
able. Taken at face value this would suggest that business angels have a similar 
success rate to professional venture capital firms. This is particularly noteworthy 
when the different stages of investments by business angels and venture capital 
funds are considered. Unlike their counterparts in other European countries, Finn­
ish venture capital funds make a high proportion of their investments in businesses 
at the early stage of development (EVCA, 1995). However, as noted earlier, most 
of the investments made by business angels are at even earlier stages. Neverthe­
less, it needs to be emphasised that this is a very inexact comparison because the 
exits by business angels have been made over a number of years whereas the ven­
ture capital exits relate to just one year.
Conventional wisdom in the venture capital industry states that “lemons ripen 
more quickly than plums.” In other words, problem investments typically appear 
before the profits from successful investments can be realised through the sale of 
the shares. This aspect of venture capital investing is confirmed in this study as 
being equally relevant to the informal venture capital market. The average time to 
exit for successful investments (i.e. any investment from which the retum was 
greater than break-even) was 5.09 years. In comparison, the time to exit for unsuc­
cessful investments (i.e. exits which involved a partial or full loss of the amount 
invested) was just 2.82 years, which reflects the vulnerability to closure of busi-
Table I
The Performance of Informal Investments From 
Which Business Angels Had Exited
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Return % ofExits^
Significant return^ 20
Modest return^ 13
Break-even 13
Partial loss 16
Total loss 38
Notes: ® Significant retum: IRR > 20%; 
 ^Modest retum: IRR < 20%; 
n = 40.
nesses in their early years after start-up (Storey, 1994, p. 93). A further contribu­
tory factor is that successful investors will not rush to harvest their investments but 
will patiently build value in their investee companies before seeking an exit 
(Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Investors exited from those investments on which 
they broke even in an average of 1.80 years.
In those cases in which the shares had some value and could be sold, the 
most common exit routes by business angels were a sale to other shareholders in 
the firm and sale to a third party. Only 16% of exits were achieved through trade 
sales (i.e. acquisition by another company) and there were no public listings 
(Table 2). However, the type of exit route was related to the success of the invest­
ment. The most frequent exit routes for successful investments were trade sales 
and sales to a third party, whereas sale to existing shareholders was the most 
common exit route for loss-making investments (Table 2 ). Trade sales are also 
the most common way in which venture capital funds realise the value of their 
investments (Abbott and Hay, 1995).
Initial public offerings (IPOs) often produce a higher price than trade sales 
(although the extent of any price differential will depend on the buoyancy of the 
stock market for IPOs). However, this is influenced by the fact that IPOs are the 
“cream of the crop” whereas trade sales will include companies that are purchased 
by large companies for strategic purposes, and for this reason may be willing to 
pay a high price, as well the more moderate performing investments and also dis­
tress sales (Bygrave Sc Timmons, 1992; Abbott & Hay, 1995). An IPO is also only 
practicable for larger companies that are able to justify a significant market capi­
talisation. For these reasons a trade sale will be the only exit option available to 
business angels in most cases.
A trade sale also has two distinct advantages over an IPO and so may be 
favoured by many investors. First, the price is fixed whereas the returns from an 
IPO, which depends on the issue price, are uncertain. Second, investors will nor­
mally be able to sell all of their shares through a trade sale (indeed, the buyer may 
insist upon 100% control) whereas in an IPO the market may construe an investor 
selling all of his shares as a negative signal. Thus, an investor may only be able to 
reaUse the full value of their investment through an IPO exit over a period of time, 
during which time the share price may fall. Indeed, a number of recent studies note 
that the long-run performance of IPO shares under-perform the market (Leleux & 
Manigart, 1994). In the case of what venture capitalists call “the living dead”, that 
is investments which have failed to meet expectations and are unlikely to produce 
a profitable exit, but nonetheless have a stable existence, the only exit route avail­
able is likely to be through a repurchase of the shares by the existing management 
team. Comparison between the exit routes of business angels and professional ven­
ture capital companies in Finland (Table 3) confirms that the most common exit
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Table 2 
Exit Routes
Return
Significant
Return
Modest
Return
Break­
even
Partial
Loss
Total
Loss
No
Informa­
tion Total
Listing on public — — — — — — —
market
Trade sale 4 2 2 — — — 8
Sale of shares to 3rd 2 3 — 1 1 3 10
party
Sale of shares to 2 — 2 4 1 3 12
other shareholders
Shares have no — — 1 2 13 3 19
value
Total 8 5 5 7 15 9 49
Table 3
Exit Routes by Finnish Venture Capital Funds
Number o f Exits
Exit Route 1993 1994
Trade sale 3 2
Sale to 3rd party 3 1
Sale to other shareholders in the company 11 11
Pay back of convertible loan 2 13
Written-off/ending of operations 7 6
Bankruptcy 9 16
Total 35 49
Source: Finnish Venture Capital Association.
route of venture capitalists is also sale to other shareholders in the company; how­
ever, a trade sale is a more common exit route for business angels.
Current Portfolio—^Performance and Exit Expectations
Business angels find it difficult to estimate the performance of their current 
investments, particularly in comparison with their expectations at the time of 
investment. Nevertheless, with this caveat in mind, it is clear that investments per­
forming below expectations exceed those performing above expectation by ratio of 
1.5:1. While differences in time periods render comparisons problematic, it would 
nevertheless appear that the portfolios of Finnish business angels contain a slightly
Dable4
Anticipated Exit Routes for Current Portfolio
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Exit Route % of Investments
Don’t know 33
Don’t plan to sell 12
Business will fail 4
Sale to other shareholders 15
Sale to 3rd party 13
Trade sale 20
Public listing 4
higher proportion of investments performing below expectations than those of UK 
business angels. In turn, UK business angels have a higher proportion of invest­
ments performing below expectations than US business angels (Mason & Harri­
son, 1994; Gaston, 1989).
A significant proportion of business angels does not have a clear exit strategy 
(Table 4), suggesting that exit plans are often not made at the time of the invest­
ment (cf. Mason & Harrison, 1996b). In terms of their exit horizons, 52% of inves­
tors anticipated holding their investments for three to five years. However, in 12% 
of cases the intention is to retain the investment indefinitely. These investors might 
be “income-seeking angels” whose motive for investing is to generate an income 
stream (and perhaps also a job) rather than a capital gain (Stevenson & Coveney, 
1996). A trade sale is the most common anticipated exit route (Table 4).
V. A COMPARISON OF “SUCCESSFUL” AND 
“UNSUCCESSFUL” INVESTORS
Clearly, the investment performance of business angels has been variable. This 
raises a number of questions concerning the factors that influence investment per­
formance. This section of the paper is concerned with two specific questions. First, 
are certain kinds of investors more successful than others? Second, are certain 
strategies for investing more successful than others?
In order to address these questions the 20 investors who had made exits were 
asked to rate the exit success of each investment that they had exited from.^ Inves­
tors were given a score for each exit, ranging from one point for a very successful 
exit to five points for an exit that resulted in a total loss.^ This enabled two groups 
of investors to be identified:
• a successful group, comprising 6  investors, with an average score of 2  or 
below (average success score of 1.31)
• an unsuccessful group, comprising 8 investors, with an average score of 
4.54
In fact, every exit of the successful investors identified in this way had been 
profitable. Similarly, the unsuccessful investors identified through this procedure 
had not made any profitable exits. A further five investors could not be allocated 
to either group because their exit performance was variable, with both successful 
and unsuccessful exits, and insufficient information was available on the exit per­
formance of one investor. The following analysis excludes these six investors.
The successful group had made a total of 10 exits (ranging from 1 to 3) 
whereas the unsuccessful group had made total of 17 exits (ranging from 1 to 6 ). 
The median number of exits for each group was the same (1.5) but the mean num­
ber of exits was higher for the unsuccessful group (2.1 cf. 1.7).
Clearly, the small number of investors prevents us from reaching definitive 
conclusions based on rigorous statistical analysis. However, as noted earlier, 
research on informal venture capital activity frequently confronts the problem of 
small sample sizes because of the difficulties in identifying business angels, espe­
cially in small countries. Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the topic and 
the total absence of any previous research on business angel exits we believe that 
the following analysis is not without merit and that the findings can at least be 
regarded as suggestive.
Personal Characteristics
Both successful and unsuccessful investors are of similar ages (average of 54 
years old), have had similar levels of education (Masters degree) and have similar 
educational backgrounds (technical/commercial). Both groups of investors have 
also had similar lengths of entrepreneurial career and have founded similar num­
bers of businesses (means of 7.1 for successful investors and 6 . 8  for unsuccessful 
investors; medians of 6 . 8  and 5.5). There are also no differences in sources of 
wealth, with dividends from, and sale of, their own company being the most com­
mon. The only clear difference between the two groups of investors is in terms of 
their work experience. Successful investors have spent more time working in top 
management positions in large and medium-sized companies and in middle man­
agement positions, whereas unsuccessful investors have spent more time working 
in top management positions in small companies (Table 5).*
Motivations for Investing
Investors were asked to rate a series of statements on motivations on a five 
point scale (4 to 0, with 4 = very important reason for investing) according to their
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Tables
Work Experience of Successful and Unsuccessful Investors
Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful
Investors Investors Investors Investors
Mean Mean Median Median
Number of Number of Number of Number of
Years Years Years Years
Large company, top management 5.5 2.1 6.5 0
Medium-sized company. 5.3 0.6 5.0 0
top management
Small company. 4.2 15.6 3.0 12.0
top management
Middle management in 10.2 3.9 10.0 2.0
any size of company
Professional 3.7 3.4 2.5 0
Civil service, top level 0 0 0 0
importance as a motive for investing. Of the 15 statements, successful and unsuc­
cessful investors diverged on just four (difference of more than 0.5). Successful
investors gave higher average scores to two statements; “investing in an interesting 
company is exciting” (3.0 cf. 2.4) and “I want to use my leisure time in an interest­
ing and beneficial way” (2.8 cf. 1.9) Unsuccessful investors also gave a higher 
average score to two statements: “I want to take an active role in developing a 
promising SME” (3.4 cf. 2.7) and “I fulfil my role in society by investing in SMEs” 
(2.1 cf. 1.3). The tentative conclusion that can be drawn is that successful investors 
are motivated to a greater extent than unsuccessful investors by the “buzz” that 
they get from being a business angel whereas altruism is a more important motiva­
tional consideration for unsuccessful investors.
Reasons for Rejecting an Investment Opportunity
It might have been anticipated that successful and unsuccessful investors differ 
in terms of the way in which they evaluate investment opportunities. However, 
there are no observable differences in the reasons given for rejecting investment 
opportunities. Issues associated with the management of the company is the key 
consideration for both groups of investors.
Deal Flow and Investment Activity
Successful investors receive a higher number of investment opportunities per 
year than unsuccessful investors (Table 6 ). Successful investors have also made 
fewer investments than unsuccessful investors and have invested smaller amounts
Table 6
Number Of Investment Opportunities and Number of Investment Made
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Successful Unsuccessjul
Investors Investors
Mean Median Mean Median
Number of in estment opportunities (per year) 12.2 7.5 8.5 4.0
Number of investment made 2.8 2.5 4.5 5.5
Amount invested (million FM) 1.45 1.2 5.0 3.75
of finance (Table 6 ). It might be expected, purely on probability grounds, that 
investors who make a larger number of investments will have a lower success rate 
in terms of the proportion of investments that are successful. Moreover, investors 
are concerned with the overall success of their portfolios, anticipating that some— 
perhaps the majority—of their investments wiU lose money or break even but that 
they will make their returns on the small proportion of very successful invest­
ments.^ Nevertheless, taking into consideration the evidence on the differences in 
deal flow and the investments made (Table 6 ) suggests that successful investors 
have the advantage over unsuccessful investors of having a wider range of oppor­
tunities to choose from and are more discriminating in those businesses in which 
they invest.
Sources of Information on Investment Opportunities
Investors were asked to indicate on a four point scale (1 = regularly, 4 = never) 
the importance of various sources of information on deal flow. The clearest differ­
ence between successful and unsuccessful investors was that friends are a much 
more important source of deal flow for unsuccessful investors (1.6 cf. 2.8). Unsuc­
cessful investors are also more likely to rely on their own active search and con­
tacts from entrepreneurs, whereas successful investors are more likely to use 
newspaper and magazine articles as a source of information on investment oppor­
tunities.
Prior Relationship with Investee Companies
A striking difference between the two groups is that unsuccessful investors are 
much more likely than successful investors to invest in friends’ businesses. Six out 
of eight unsuccessful investors had made investments in friends’ businesses com­
pared with only 2  out of the six successful investors, and two-thirds of investments 
made by unsuccessful investors (24 out of 36) were in friends’ businesses com­
pared with just over 10% (2 of 17) of investments by successful investors.
Expressed another way, successful investors are much more likely than unsuccess­
ful business angels to make investments in businesses in which there is no friend­
ship connection with the principals.
Post-investment Relationship
There continues to be controversy as to whether venture capitalists add value 
to new businesses (Sapienza, 1992). If it is accepted that business angels can add 
value to their investments through their hands on involvement then it might be 
expected that successful business angels will have greater involvement with their 
investee businesses. On the other hand, greater involvement may not always be 
cost-effective and investors must balance the costs against the benefits. Thus, suc­
cessful business angels may limit their involvement in order to maximise the return 
on the time that they put into their investee businesses (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). 
The evidence indicates that there were no differences between successful and 
unsuccessful investors in terms of the roles that they typically play in their investee 
businesses (usually board member) nor in the frequency of contact with their 
investee businesses (usually a few times a month) nor the amount of time that they 
typically spend with their investee businesses (average of 3.5 hours for successful 
investors and 4.0 hours for unsuccessful investors). Nevertheless, as unsuccessful 
investors have made more investments than successful investors, it is possible that 
they have overburdened themselves and have failed to economise on their involve­
ment (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994; Fiet, 1995).
These quantitative measures clearly give no indication of the nature of the con­
tributions made by investors to their investee companies. This issue was explored 
by asking investors to indicate from a list of 2 2  areas of potential involvement their 
own perception of the value of the contributions that they have made to their 
investee companies. Successful and unsuccessful investors diverge in terms of 
their perception of the value of their contributions in 1 2  of these areas of involve­
ment. In each case unsuccessful investors had a higher average assessment of the 
value of their contribution than did successful investors. Examples of such diver­
gences include the following^*  ^ (the average score for unsuccessful investor is 
given first):
• assisting in negotiations (3.3 cf. 1.7)
• introducing new customers and suppliers (3.3 cf. 1.7)
• developing new financing chaimels (3.1 cf. 1.3)
• assisting in competitor and industry sector analysis (2.9 cf. 1.2 )
However, previous studies of the involvement of both business angels and 
venture capitalists in their investee companies, and their value-added contribution.
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indicates that these roles tend to be the least important in adding value (MacMillan, 
1989; Harrison & Mason, 1992b).
Performance of Current Investment Portfolio
Past investment success is, of course, not necessarily a guide to future perfor­
mance and there is no certainty that successful investors will continue to achieve 
profitable exits in the future. Only four of the six successful investors had current 
investments. Of these investments, which totalled 13, they judged seven to be per­
forming below expectation, two were thought to be performing as expected and 
only one was thought to be performing above expectations. Investors said that it 
was too early to tell how the other three investments were performing. This com­
pares with the unsuccessful investor group who had a total of 17 current invest­
ments, of which they considered only six to be performing below expectations and 
a further six were performing above expectations. This might suggest that the 
investment performance of investors fluctuates over time, and that the fortunes of 
the two groups of investors will change in the future. However, an alternative 
explanation may be that the unsuccessful group of investors have too optimistic a 
view of the performance of their portfolio.
VI. CONCLUSION
This is the first study to have examined the exits of business angels. However, the 
study is based on an extremely small sample and so conclusions must inevitably be 
tentative. The findings are, nevertheless, valuable insofar as they provide evidence 
on a key aspect of informal venture capital activity where no previous information 
existed. Two further limitations of the study should be borne in mind. First, only 
one simple measure of exit success is used. A more appropriate measure would be 
based on actual cumulative cash flows (although it might be difficult to obtain such 
data from private investors). This would also allow an analysis to be made of port­
folio returns which is likely to be more relevant, as the modus operandi of venture 
capital investing is that a small number of very successful investments should 
more than offset those which lose money or break even. Second, the evidence 
relates to investors not investments. While it has been possible to build up a gener­
alised picture of the investment behaviour of successful and unsuccessful investors 
on the basis of their overall investment activity (either all investments or current 
portfolio) the implicit assumption has been that the exited investments were not 
atypical. Deal-specific information is required in order to make further progress in 
understanding the investment performance and exit activity of business angels and 
the characteristics of successful and unsuccessful investments.
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The key findings can be grouped under two headings. The first set of findings 
relate to aggregate investment performance. The investors in this study achieved a 
positive return on only about one-third of their investments. However, about 1 in 5 
of all investments were very successful, generating an IRR of over 20%. Invest­
ments by private individuals in unquoted companies can therefore be very profit­
able. In this sample of Finnish business angels the exit success has been similar to 
that for professional venture capital funds. However, this is an inexact comparison 
because the exits by business angels have been achieved over a number of years 
whereas the venture capital exits refer to a single year. The most common ways in 
which business angels harvest their successful investments are by means of a trade 
sale or sale to a third party. Where the sale of investments in “living dead” and 
loss-making companies is possible, they are normally sold to existing shareholders 
in the business.
The second set of findings relate to the identification of differences between 
investors in terms of their investment success. This study identified two small sub­
groups of investors. One group of six investors had achieved 10 exits, all of which 
were successful, and another group of 8  investors who had made 17 exits, none of 
which were successful. A number of differences were identified between these two 
groups of investors.
(a) Successful investors have spent more of their career in top management 
positions in large companies and in middle management posts whereas 
unsuccessful investors have spent longer in top management positions in 
small companies. However, it is unclear how previous work experience 
relates to investment success. Possible links are with the ability to evalu­
ate investment opportunities or in managing the investment.
(b) In terms of their motivations for investing, successful investors gave 
greater emphasis to the fun and satisfaction of being involved with entre­
preneurial venmres, whereas unsuccessful investors gave greater empha­
sis to altruistic and social responsibility motives.
(c) Successful investors had a larger flow of investment opportunities and 
made fewer investments, implying that they are more discriminating in 
making investments.
(d) Unsuccessful investors were more likely to derive deal flow from friends 
and to invest in friends’ businesses. This may be either because fiiend- 
ship compromises the investment decision or it could be because friend­
ship affects the nature of the post-investment relationship, leading to less 
value added.
(e) Unsuccessful investors had a higher estimation of their value-added con­
tribution to the businesses in which they invested.
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However, because of the nature of the data upon which this study is based 
establishing causaUty is problematic. We simply cannot say from the available evi­
dence whether business angels with a successful investment performance are suc­
cessful because of the superior quality of their flow of information on investment 
opportunities, because of their approach to investing or because of the value-added 
contribution that they make to their investee businesses.
In view of the critical importance of exit for venture capital investors, it is sur­
prising that this is the first ever study to have examined the performance of infor­
mal venture capital investments and the exit routes used by business angels. 
Although the nature of the available data has limited the scope of the study, and the 
geographical context may limit the generalisability of the findings, the paper has 
achieved its main purpose of contributing some empirical evidence on a topic 
where information was previously non-existent. But clearly much remains to be 
discovered and so further research on issues associated with the way in which busi­
ness angels harvest their investments should be a high priority. The paper therefore 
concludes by sketching out a research agenda.
In the case of the formal, or institutional, venture capital industry the focus of 
research has been on the initial public offering (BPO) market (e.g. Bygrave et al, 
1994). However, whereas a thriving IPO market is vital to venture capital compa­
nies in determining their level of returns (Bygrave, 1994), this is likely to be of lit­
tle or no relevance to business angels in view of the relatively small size of their 
investments and the stage of business development at which they invest. But while 
not excluding the question of the significance of the IPO market for business 
angels in any research agenda, a much more important issue concerns the need for 
a better understanding of the trade sale process (Relander et al, 1994) which, on the 
evidence of this study, is the dominant way in which business angels exit from 
their successful investments. It should also be noted that in spite of the attention 
that is given to IPOs a trade sale is also the single most important exit route for 
venture capital company investors in Europe (Relander et al, 1994; EVCA, 1995). 
A number of questions can be highlighted (Relander et al, 1994). First, why is the 
ttade sale route favoured by business angels as a means of realising the value of 
their investments? Is it the favoured choice amongst alternatives, and if so what are 
the advantages, or is it the only realistic exit opportunity available? Second, how is 
the acquiring company identified and how is contact made? Is the identification of 
an acquiring company one of the value-added contributions of a business angel? 
Third, how is the actual timing of the sale determined? Is it planned from the outset 
of the investment by the business angel or is it opportunistic? And how is the price 
determined? Finally, what is the attitude of the entrepreneur(s) to the exit and to the 
exit possibilities? Do the business angel and the entrepreneur have similar objec­
tives for an exit?
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NOTES
1. This comparison excludes investments in management buyouts.
2. This phrase was coined by the Center for Venture Research, The Whittemore School of Busi­
ness, University of New Hampshire
3. Areas where our understanding of the characteristics and operation of the informal venture cap­
ital market and its role in the early stage equity financing market remains limited, and which 
represent fruitful lines for further enquiry, have been identified by Freear, Sohl & Wetzel 
(1996) in their paper to the 4th State of the Art in Entrepreneurship Research conference and 
also by Mason (1996).
4. See Suomi & Lumme (1994) for further details of the methodology.
5. The exchange rate at the time of writing (July 1996) was 4.66 FM = $1.
6. This is the only information that was collected on the performance on individual investments. 
We are therefore unable to undertake any analysis on the characteristics of successful and 
unsuccessful investments.
7. The full scoring system is as follows: 1 point for a very successful exit (an IRR of more than 
20%), 2 points for a moderately successful exit (an IRR of less than 20%), 3 points for an exit 
that broke even, 4 points for an investment that resulted in a partial loss and 5 points for an 
investment that produced a total loss. See Table 1 for definitions of “very” and “moderately’' 
successful.
8. Unfortunately, the data do not enable us to distinguish between management positions in which 
they were employees and management positions in their own company. If the companies that 
were founded by successful investors were larger (medium-sized) than those founded by unsuc­
cessful investors this would account for some of the differences in work experience, although it 
would not account for the greater length of time of successful investors in middle management 
positions or top management positions in large companies.
9. This is the venture capitalist’s 2:6:2 rule: two investments will fail, six will survive but make 
little or no return (the “living dead”) and two will be very successful (Bygrave & Timmons, 
1992).
10. 5 = very significant impact, 1 = no impact; 0 = did not participate in that area.
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